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Article 5

Hansen: Responses to Ten Questions

RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS
Victor Hansent
1. Do Americans need to give up their privacy to be safer? Can we be
less secure and lessfree?'
The responses by the Bush administration, Congress,
and the courts to the attacks of September 11 have brought an
unprecedented level of attention to a multitude of national security
issues. These issues have included legal questions related to the
detention and punishment of terrorist suspects; the nature and
scope of the state secrets privilege; the use of secret evidence in
terrorist prosecutions; the executive's authority to conduct
domestic surveillance outside of the structure established by
Congress; and the proper role of the courts, to name a few. At the
center of these and a myriad of other national security issues lies
one fundamental question: In the post-September 11 world, must
Americans sacrifice privacy and liberty in order to be more
protected?
Many suggest that the events of September 11 and the threats
posed by transnational terrorist organizations represent new and
heretofore unanticipated threats for which a new legal paradigm is
required. We often hear the refrain that September 11 changed
everything. Perhaps it did. But before we rush headlong into some
new legal order, we should remember that many of the national
security issues we are grappling with today reflect at their most
fundamental level the question of how to balance security and the
t Professor of Law, New England Law, Boston. Professor Hansen teaches
Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, and Prosecutorial Ethics. Before
joining the New England faculty, Professor Hansen served a twenty-year career in
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The language, "Can we be less secure and less free?", was added because the
author slightly recharacterized the question.
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continued survival of our Nation against the privacy and liberty
rights of the individual. So, while the threats may be new and
different, the tensions inherent in attempting to achieve both
security and individual liberty in a democracy are as old as the
Republic.
Some of those engaged in this debate seem to have an almost
knee-jerk reaction against any of the Government's security efforts
if individual privacy and liberty are adversely impacted. To these
commentators, no amount of added security can justify any
diminution of individual rights. While it is important to be vigilant
anytime the Government seeks to reduce or encroach on privacy
and liberty interests, I agree with Justice Jackson that the
In some
Constitution was not intended to be a suicide pact.
must
give way
privacy
interests
circumstances, individual liberty and
to the collective interests of security.
On the other end of the spectrum are those who would suggest
that security at any cost is a price we must pay to protect the
country from the terrorist threats we face in the twenty-first
century. People in this camp often see the executive as the
government branch uniquely suited to deal with this new threat,
and they argue that the executive should enjoy great, if not
absolute, deference in combating terrorism both domestically and
Unquestionably, our constitutional structure
internationally.
envisions a significant role for the executive, as Commander in
Chief of our military forces, to protect against terrorist threats.
Nonetheless, our constitutional structure favors a deliberative
process, even in questions of national security, and Congress in
particular, has significant responsibilities in striking the
appropriate balance between security and individual liberties.
Finally, I must also take issue with those who would suggest
that we can have both complete security and absolute protection of
individual liberties at no cost. This is often the claim of politicians
who have difficulty leveling with the electorate. We, of course,
should know better. Everything has a price and there is simply no
way to avoid or eliminate the tension that exists between collective
security and individual liberties. Rather, what we should be striving
for is to manage that tension in a way that allows for a flexible
approach that can respond to real threats to our Nation while
maintaining the core values of individual liberty which lies at the
2.

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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heart of our democratic system.
In managing this tension and striking an effective and fair
balance, we must be careful not to adopt approaches that will leave
us less secure and at the same time less free. This, I believe, is
where many of the policies of the Bush administration have left us
after September 11. These failings represent the worst of both
In this essay, I examine aspects of the Bush
worlds.
program and the
administration's domestic surveillance
administration's approach to the trial of enemy combatants as two
examples where the administration's efforts have diminished
individual liberty with little or no improvement to our collective
security. I suggest some important lessons that we can learn from
these examples, in the hope that we avoid similar mistakes in the
future.
In December 2005, the New York Times revealed the existence
of a domestic surveillance program which the Bush administration
had been conducting since right after the September 11 attacks.
The Times reported that, after the September 11 attacks, President
Bush secretly authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop
on Americans and others inside the United States to search for
evidence of terrorist activity without court-approved warrants
ordinarily required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) .'

The Bush administration justified this program on the grounds
that Conaress's passage of the Authorization to Use Military Force
(AUMF), a week after September 11, was broad enough to serve as
authority for the intrusion on privacy implicated by surveillance of
international calls made to or received from our enemies. Implicit
in the justification to bypass the FISA structure is the contention
that the United States was facing an unknown and immediate
threat, and the exigencies of the situation called for unilateral
action by the President.
It is possible that in the initial days and weeks after September
11, while the Government was trying to assess the nature and scope
of the terrorist threat, any delay created by complying with the
3. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
4. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. V 2005)) (authorizing the President to
"use all necessary and appropriate force against those ... he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks [of September 11], or

harbored such organizations or persons").
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FISA structure could indeed have been costly. Given the actual
attacks that occurred, and given the Government's inability to
anticipate and stop those attacks before they occurred, quick
unilateral action that could allow the Government to obtain
information helpful in assessing the possibility of additional attacks
would seem to fit within the ambit of the exigent circumstances
authority. But the question is, how long did such an exigency last?
While we know very little about the specifics of the domestic
surveillance program, we do know that it operated solely within the
executive branch, free of congressional or judicial oversight from
late 2001 until the President agreed to bring the program under
the FISA structure in the spring of 2007, more than five years later.
It seems doubtful that the exigency lasted for five years. So, at
some point during the conduct of this program, the values of
individual liberty and privacy would have outweighed the national
security interests to conduct domestic surveillance without any
meaningful oversight. This was a situation where President Bush's
program made us less free, and because President Bush had
continually refused to make any details of the program public, we
simply have no way of determining if we were any more secure over
that five-year period.
I believe one of the most important lessons we should take
from this experience is the need to have an effective means that
Congress, the courts, and the public can use to evaluate a
President's claim of emergency circumstances. Fortunately, we are
not without guidance. My colleague, Lawrence Friedman, and I
have argued that the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence provides some valuable guidance. 5 The Court has
created an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement in certain exigent circumstances where the benefits of
obtaining a warrant are outweighed by the costs to law enforcement
and to society at large caused by the delay in obtaining a warrant.
There are a number of factors that emerged from these Fourth
Amendment cases that are also applicable in the national security
context. The most important factor to consider is the potential
adverse consequences that might result if the President were not
able to respond to a national security threat immediately and
unilaterally. Still, a national security exigency requiring unilateral

5. See VICTOR M. HANSEN & LAWRENCE FRIED.mAN, THE CASE FOR CONGRESS:
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE WAR ON TERROR (forthcoming 2009).
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presidential action cannot be so broad as to include every
conceivable threat to American interests or the security of
American citizens.
There are undoubtedly situations in which the Government
may need to act quickly-for example, the immediate need to
capture suspected terrorists or to thwart an imminent terrorist plot
against U.S. interests. This is closely analogous to hot pursuit
situations in the Fourth Amendment context. But this should be
the exception, not the rule. Even in a global environment of
transnational terrorism, not every terrorist threat requires or
justifies unilateral presidential action. Were unilateral action
justified against every threat, there would be little to distinguish
true exigency from the kinds of threats which the Framers clearly
anticipated when they created a governmental structure that
promotes oversight and accountability of the executive's actions.
Assessment of national security exigencies, like their Fourth
Amendment counterparts, also must consider the seriousness of
the threat and the potential harm to American interests. National
security threats pose various degrees of harm, and not every action
to prevent future harm requires unilateral executive action. Efforts
to gather evidence and information about terrorist cells and future
terrorist activity may be more like normal law enforcement
investigatory and evidence-gathering activities, all of which we know
may be effectively accomplished within the strictures of the warrant
requirement and like legal regimes.
Similarly, the fact that the United States has suffered terrorist
attacks in the past does not create an ongoing exigent circumstance
that lasts in perpetuity. At some point after a threat comes to
fruition, the immediate danger will end. When it does, the
exigency no longer exists, and the need for unilateral executive
action also ends. Were this not the case, the President would enjoy
unchecked authority to act unilaterally from first contact with the
enemy until the President alone decided the threat no longer
existed, effectively delaying any real possibility of timely assessments
of the efficacy of his actions.
The freshness and credibility of the information and evidence
giving rise to a national security threat should also be considered in
determining whether a true exigency exists. Information that is
recent and specific may justify emergency executive action. As in
the Fourth Amendment context, however, stale information,
evidence, or intelligence alluding to events that have already taken
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place, or information that is of uncertain reliability would not
justify either a warrantless search or the unilateral exercise of
exigent- circumstances authority by the executive.
Further, in considering the scope of exigent circumstances,
the U.S. Supreme Court has often sought to determine the
availability of less intrusive alternatives to warrantless searches.
Similar considerations are appropriate in respect to the President's
response to national security threats. Those threats might run the
spectrum from true exigencies to inconsequential information, and
there are likely to be many threats which should be taken seriously,
but do not rise to the level of an exigency. In these cases, the
President should look for alternatives to unilateral action that allow
Congress to both consult and perform its oversight functions.
In those cases in which an exigency does exist and unilateral
executive action is justified, care must be taken to honor
appropriate limits on the scope and proportionality of the
President's actions lest the exigency exception swallow the
constitutional requirements of oversight and accountability. It is
equally important to ensure that unilateral actions by the President
in response to national security threats are commensurate with the
scope of the exigency. Police in hot pursuit of a suspect may search
a home where they believe the suspect is hiding, to locate the
suspect or his confederates and to eliminate potential threats to
police safety. But the police may not engage in a warrantless search
of the entire home to look for contraband or other possible
evidence of the crime. So, too, when U.S. forces are pursuing
terrorists, their actions must be limited to ensure that the exigency
does not become an excuse-or a subterfuge-to engage in actions
unrelated to the exigency at hand, particularly actions that
potentially infringe upon the rights and interests of American
citizens.
Finally, perhaps the signal check on the executive's exigent
circumstances authority is the most obvious: temporality. Once a
threat in fact dissipates, for whatever reason, so too does the
President's need to act unilaterally. At that point, the President
must honor the requirements of our constitutional structure and
seek congressional authorization and the oversight that comes with
such authorization.
Unfortunately, this level of scrutiny and analysis has been
largely lacking when it comes to assessing the Bush administration's
domestic surveillance program. Instead, we have many critics of
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the Bush administration's program who suggested that any
departure from the FISA structure was both illegal and
unconstitutional, and from the Bush administration we had the
argument that in a time of war, the President's inherent though
unspecified constitutional authority coupled with a general
congressional authorization gave the President virtually limitless
authority. It seems to me that gravitating to either of these
extremes will not allow us to effectively manage the inherent
tension between collective security and individual liberty. I suggest
that one of the most important lessons we can learn from this
episode is that we already have in place a flexible and workable
structure that allows Congress, the courts, and the public to assess
the nature and scope of claimed exigencies and, more importantly,
to place reasonable limits on the executive's claims of exigency in
the national security context.
A second example where I believe the Bush administration's
polices resulted in diminished individual liberty with little or no
improvement to our collective security is with the detention and
prosecution of enemy combatants, primarily at Guantanamo.
Much has been written on this, and this is an area where Congress
eventually legislated and where the Supreme Court and the lower
courts have been actively involved. To put it gently, President
Bush's efforts to detain and try these so-called "enemy combatants"
have not been well received.
Rather than focus on any particular aspect of the Bush
administration's initial or subsequent policies or programs in this
area, I want to focus on a broader point, which I think underlies
much of the criticism to date. A primary failing of the Bush
administration was its attempt to pick and choose only certain
portions of the law of armed conflict applicable to the treatment of
detained persons. The expectation by the Bush administration was
that certain aspects of the law of armed conflict would aid and
justify the long-term detention and expeditious prosecution of
these detainees. What was missing in the Bush administration's
approach was any recognition that the law of armed conflict also
includes a number of legal obligations and protections that are
owed to the detainees. The broader lesson we should learn from
this episode is that in order for the rule of law to have any
meaning, the executive must comply with all relevant legal
obligations. He should not be allowed to manipulate the law to
reach a desired outcome. Otherwise, the rights and liberties of all
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of us are put at risk, not just those who are detained in
Guantanamo.
As an example of the Bush administration's attempts to "cherry
pick" aspects of the law of armed conflict that were favorable to its
objectives, consider the administration's initial formulations of the
military commissions process.
Under the initial order that
established the military commissions, the presiding officer could
direct the closure of the proceedings or a portion of the
proceedings to prevent the disclosure of protected information. As
part of the closure, the presiding officer could exclude the accused
and the civilian defense counsel from the proceedings. Though
detailed military defense counsel could not be excluded, they were
restricted from disclosing any information presented during the
closed sessions to the client or the civilian defense counsel without
the prior approval of the presiding officer.
The Bush administration's rationale for these extremely
restrictive rules was the claimed need to protect secret evidence
and sources of information. Clearly, such a procedure would not
have been allowed if the cases were tried in a U.S. district court.
So, the Bush administration's decision to try these cases by means
of a military commission was motivated at least in part by a desire to
create a judicial forum that was more favorable towards the
Government's interests.
There is no question that the use of military commissions to try
enemy forces for law of war and other violations has a long
historical precedent. Such a process is even codified under Articles
18 and 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice." However, when
the use of such forums is motivated primarily as a matter of
convenience and by a hope that these forums will more likely reach
an outcome favorable to the Government, their legitimacy is
undermined. To help prevent this, part of the customary law
reflected in Common Article 3 and the Four Geneva Conventions
requires the passing of sentences to be pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
In their formulation of the military commissions procedures
and the use of secret evidence, the Bush administration ignored
this requirement. In part, this served as the basis for the Supreme
Court's invalidation of the Bush administration's military
6.

See Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-821 (2006).
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commission procedures in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.' The Court did not
precisely define what the term "regularly constituted court" means
under Common Article 3, other than to indicate that it likely
excludes special tribunals unless those tribunals incorporate
recognized principles governing the administration ofjustice. At a
minimum, for the military commission procedures established by
the President to qualify as regularly constituted courts, any
departures from the standards of the military justice system must be
justified by some practical need. The Hamdan Court found no such
justification.
There are other circumstances in which the Bush
administration selected out certain aspects of the law of armed
conflict in order to serve its own purposes, without considering the
obligations that the law imposes. The Bush administration's broad
definition of enemy combatant, which included those who
"purposely and materially supported hostilities against the United
States or its co-belli erents who is not a lawful enemy combatant," is
one such example. By defining and applying the term in such a
broad manner, the Bush administration undermined the principle
of military necessity that serves as a justification for the continued
Likewise, the Bush
detention of enemy combatants.
administration's inclusion of conspiracy and material support to
terrorism as violations of the law of armed conflict, in order to cast
the net of war crimes liability as broadly as possible, is without
historical precedent and violates the principle of legality. A critical
lesson that we should learn from the Bush administration's
attempts to cherry pick the law of armed conflict as applied to
Guantanamo detainees is: violating the rule of law in such a
manner undermines the moral and legal authority of the United
States and it has the exact opposite effect than was intended.
Instead of making it easier to fight the terrorists who would seek to
do us harm, Guantanamo has become a recruiting tool for future
terrorists. It has also severely undermined our ability to develop
strong coalitions with other countries who share our interests. In
that way, we are less, not more secure.
Additionally, the Bush administration's disregard for the rule
of law has made us less free. If the President can significantly limit
access by a defendant and his attorney to relevant and material
7. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
8. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, sec. 3(a) (1),
§ 948a(1) (i), 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a).
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evidence based on the defendant's status, a status that the President
alone can determine, because it would be difficult to convict the
defendant if he had access to that evidence in a military tribunal,
then these same steps could be taken to limit a service member's or
a citizen's access to this kind of evidence in a future situation where
the President alone believed a similarjustification existed.
The lesson here is simple, but profound. Departure from the
rule of law is fraught with danger. Even in the arena of national
security, leaders must be careful not to jettison the time-tested
values reflected in the rule of law, for either the quick fix or the
seemingly expeditious alternative. As frustrating as it may be to
abide by the rule of law, as we see now, the alternative is likely to be
much worse.
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